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Abstract
This paper applies the IMF EBA methodology to a China-specific time series analysis, using a 2SLS
instrumented regression with Newey-West standard errors to determine the policy gap that results from
PBOC intervention. We find the impact of reserve accumulation to be more significant in magnitude than
indicated by the EBA, demonstrating a modest improvement in accuracy with the introduction of central
bank liquidity swaps as a novel instrument. Evidence of a long term equilibrium relationship is also found
between the real effective exchange rate and reserve accumulation, with the presence of medium level capital
controls.
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Motivation 
 
The past year’s debate on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Trade 
Promotion Authority (TPA) has led to discussion on what is referred to as 
currency manipulation, the act of devaluing currency in order to increase exports 
and reduce imports.  
Trade rules have obliged countries to refrain from such practices, but 
enforcement of such obligations depends on certification by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) “that a country’s exchange rate policies were contravening 
IMF obligations as well as distorting trade flows” (Bergsten and Schott 2015). 
The Hatch-Wyden amendment to TPP attempted to address the issue of 
currency manipulation through existing membership obligations in the IMF, with 
Senator Hatch (R-UT), chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, directly 
referencing the results of the External Balance Assessment (EBA) in May, 2015 
speech on the senate floor. The amendment failed, but it highlights the 
significance policymakers attach to the conclusions of the IMF methodology. 
Recent events have drawn attention to China in particular. The People’s 
Republic has experienced $158.7 billion in capital outflows in December of 2015 
alone, with the 2015 total outflows estimated to be at $1 trillion (Bloomberg 
2016). In response, new capital controls were introduced in September of 2015. 
The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has had to intervene to support the Yuan. As 
a result, China’s foreign exchange (FX) reserves hit a three year low in January of 
2016 (Wei 2016), with December 2015 marking the largest single monthly drop 
($107.9 billion) since 2003 (Yap 2016). 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of PBOC intervention 
on China’s real effective exchange rate (REER). This paper builds upon the 
IMF’s EBA methodology, with the goal of demonstrating value in country-
specific analysis in contrast to the EBA cross-country panel approach.  
Forex intervention is when a central bank enters the foreign exchange 
market to buy or sell currency, typically through FX reserves, to influence 
exchange rates. 
As to the why, various motives are cited in literature. Mohanty and Berger 
of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) survey 19 central banks to rank 
motives for intervention and find the primarily motivation for intervention is to 
curb excessive exchange rate speculation (Mohanty and Berger 2013, 58). 
Attempts to control inflation, discourage sudden capital inflows or outflows, 
ensure financial stability, and build or reduce FX reserves are all found to be 
motivators for intervention as reported by central banks.   
The paper is divided into three sections. Beginning with a literature review 
that outlines the measures used to proxy for intervention, the recent history of the 
Yuan and China’s exchange rate regime, as well as an explanation of the purpose 
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 capital controls serve for sterilized intervention. This is followed by a data and 
methodology section, explaining the EBA and characteristics that make this paper 
distinct from the IMF approach. The final results section covers the instruments 
used in this study, the impact of intervention, consistency with the EBA results, as 
well as contributions to literature. 
 
I. Literature Review 
Measures of intervention & Lack of Transparency 
 
Proxies are used to measure intervention because there is a lack of public 
intervention data, as only some central banks disclose such data, while others do 
not. This has acted as a major hindrance on the further study of intervention 
(Edison 1993). 
The PBOC does not disclose intervention and currency composition of FX 
reserves. It is not uncommon for central banks to keep intervention confidential. 
One possible reason is Taylor’s (1982a and 1982b) explanation, dating back to the 
fixed exchange rate Bretton-Woods era, where any reports of intervention could 
result in a panic and run on a currency. However, given the lack of transparency 
which has persisted since the end of Bretton-Woods, literature (Neely 2000, 21) 
argues central banks may wish to avoid accountability.  
Neely also brings up the possibility of secret interventions, or attempts to 
conceal the size and/or volume of intervention, which can sometimes prove more 
effective in influencing exchange rates (Bhattacharya and Weller 1997). 
 
Intervention Proxy 
 
The metric used in this paper is changes in FX reserves from period-to-period, as 
used by the EBA. Multiple studies have used change in reserves as a proxy for 
intervention before (C. Neely 2000; Obstfeld 1983; Kearney and MacDonald 
1986; Gartner 1987, 1991).  
However, one concern over the use of changes in FX reserves as a proxy 
measure is such reserves can change for a variety of other reasons. This can be 
due to currency swap agreements, paying back foreign-denominated debt (Neely 
2000), swap lines with private firms, and other factors outlined below.  
Other measures can be found in the Treasury Department’s semi-annual 
report to congress on exchange rates. The Treasury uses levels of FX reserves to 
observe reserve accumulation, which can indicate a devalued currency (Powell 
2013, 2), as well as two undisclosed measures that, upon inquiry, remain 
confidential.  
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 A third measure used in literature includes news reports, due a lack of 
transparent intervention data (Neely 2000; Peiers 1997; Goodhart and Hesse 
1993).  
 
Challenges to Change in Reserves Proxy 
 
The value of FX reserves can change as a result of multiple reasons. The FX value 
of the currencies held in reserve can shift. One could potentially compensate for 
changes in valuation of a currency if one knows the composition of reserves. 
However, such composition is not disclosed by the PBOC. The other two reasons 
are interest income/coupon payments as well as changes in value of the 
underlying asset(s) (Neely 2000, 22) such as Treasuries. There are also other uses 
of reserves. For example, changes might encompass any government purchase 
from abroad or payment of debt denominated in a foreign currency (Neely 2000, 
6).  
Intervention can also be carried out without FX reserves, in order to show 
no changes in reserves on a central bank’s balance sheets. Existing literature 
(Neely 2000, 22) discusses Taylor’s (1982a and 1982b) findings regarding how 
France, Italy, Spain, and the UK utilized nationalized industries to conduct 
transactions in the 1970s to hide intervention. There is also evidence of Japan and 
France intervening using hidden reserves held at commercial banks (Neely 2000, 
22). Neely also discusses how a central back can conduct intervention through 
forward markets, arguing a central bank can “offset with a spot transaction when 
the forward contract is executed.”(Neely 2000, 22).  
Neely further discusses how allocation of special drawing rights (SDRs) 
from the IMF may alter FX reserves, but this does not prove to be an issue in 
China’s case as SDRs are kept as a separate line item on PBOC balance sheets.  
 
The Yuan in review 
 
This brief survey of the Yuan exchange rate begins in 2005, when China broke 
from the peg to the dollar in July, (Weisenthal 2015) and by Sept. the U.S. 
Treasury accused the IMF of being “asleep at the wheel” for allowing China to 
maintain an undervalued currency (“Remarks by Under Secretary… Adams” 
2005). 
By April 2012 the Yuan trading band went from 0.5 percent to 1 percent 
(Weisenthal 2015). The trading band is the rate at which the PBOC allows the 
Yuan to rise or fall from a daily midpoint rate set each day (Sweeney and Jianxin 
2014). The larger this band is, the greater a role market forces can play in 
determining the exchange rate. The set midpoint rate can also be referred to as the 
central parity rate. 
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 In March 2014 the PBOC widened the Yuan trading band from one to two 
percent(Sweeney and Jianxin 2014). By June China’s FX reserves peaked at $3.9 
trillion, as the PBOC began to sell dollars to support the Yuan (Weisenthal 2015).  
The following April in 2015 Deputy Director of the IMF’s Asia Pacific 
Department, Markus Rodlauer, said the Yuan was close to a point where it was 
“no longer being undervalued”(Weisenthal 2015). By Aug. the PBOC set the 
Yuan central parity down 1.9 percent, further closing the gap between central 
parity and the spot price. The move was welcomed by the IMF, as it allowed 
market forces to play a greater role in determining the exchange rate (Weisenthal 
2015).  
Later that month on Aug. 11 markets saw the single largest devaluation of 
the Yuan in 20 years, followed by a second devaluation the following day. 
However, the PBOC attempted to reassure markets it was not looking to embark 
on a steady depreciation (Inman and Ryan 2015). In November of 2015 the IMF 
approved the addition of the Yuan to its reserve currency (i.e. SDR) basket. 
Finally, this February (2016) marked the lowest FX reserve levels since 
2012, with half a trillion dollar decline in FX reserves in 2015, the first ever 
annual decline seen for China (Bloomberg 2016). 
 
Use of Capital Controls  
 
The use of effective capital controls allows policymakers to influence exchange 
rates through sterilized intervention (Engel 2011). 
Given a basic scenario, let one say the PBOC sells dollar-denominated 
assets from its FX reserves. By increasing the supply of dollars in the dollar forex 
market, the PBOC can appreciate the Yuan against the dollar towards a target 
exchange rate. However, this sale of dollar-denominated FX decreases China’s 
monetary base by definition. To counteract this effect, the PBOC sells bonds to 
sterilize the intervention, with capital controls necessarily to minimizing the 
impact on the monetary base effectively. 
Sterilization by a central bank means “[reversing] the effects of the foreign 
exchange transaction on the monetary base,”(Neely 2000, 21). As opposed to 
unsterilized intervention, which is the equivalent of carrying out domestic 
monetary policy (Neely 2000, 21) through changing of the monetary base. Neely 
provides an example; “When a central bank buys (sells) foreign exchange, the 
monetary base increases (decreases) by the amount of the purchase (sale).”(Neely 
2000, 1). To reverse (i.e. sterilize) the effect on the domestic monetary base, a 
central bank can buy (sell) domestic bonds (Neely 2000; Edison 1993). 
However, sterilized intervention has no effect on exchange rates if 
domestic and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes (i.e. currency denomination of 
bond does not matter to investor). If investors are indifferent about holding a 
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 domestic or foreign bond, then changes in the supply of bonds should not have an 
impact on the exchange rate (Dominguez 2008), and central banks attempts to 
issue bonds to sterilize intervention would be theoretically ineffective.  
Capital controls provide for limited capital mobility, resulting in foreign 
and domestic currency denominated assets being imperfect substitutes. As a 
result, when a central bank issues bonds with capital controls in place, it can 
effectively lower the price of bonds domestically and absorb the extra liquidity to 
keep the monetary base unchanged. 
 
Recent Events 
 
The past decade has seen a gradual liberalization of capital controls in China. 
However, the capital flight in the third and fourth quarters of 2015 may change 
this, as China introduced new controls in September of 2015 (Wei and Trivedi). 
These controls are not perfect. December of 2015 alone saw $158.7 billion in 
capital outflows, while the year’s outflow stands at $1 trillion (Bloomberg 2016). 
Recent events from July 2015 onward are what led us to limit the paper’s time 
horizon to 2015 quarter two, given the recent volatility in FX reserve changes, 
capital outflows, and the corresponding controls to prevent such outflows.   
 
II. Data and Methodology 
Real Broad Effective Exchange Rate (REER) 
 
The REER index is an average of bilateral real exchange rates between a country 
(China) and its trading partners; weighted by respective trade shares of each 
partner. It constitutes the amount of foreign exchange needed to buy RMB. For 
example, if the REER rises for China the RMB appreciates, as you need more FX 
to buy RMB. REER indices are provided by the Bank for International 
Settlements. 
 
Policy Variables 
 
Foreign Exchange (FX) Intervention 
 
Intervention is proxied for using quarterly changes in FX reserves as listed from 
the PBOC balance sheets. These changes are scaled to real GDP. Change in FX 
reserves is interacted with the Quinn capital controls index, where 0 represents no 
controls, while 1 represents full controls. These two variables are interacted 
because the use of effective capital controls allow policymakers to influence 
exchange rates through sterilized intervention (Engel 2011).  
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 The issue of endogeneity arises with the use change in reserves interacted 
with capital controls. The presence of other control variables as well as 
instruments are used to correct for this.  
M2 (scaled to GDP) is used to account for a crisis prevention motive, 
while U.S. short term interest rates are used to capture reserve accumulation 
motives (Phillips et al. 2013).  
This paper also introduces a new instrument to control for endogeneity 
between reserve accumulation and the level of REER, liquidity swap agreements. 
This is proxied for through the volume of swaps as reported by the Russian 
Central Bank, as Russia and China have had liquidity swap agreements in place 
since Oct. 2014 (Ostroukh 2014). This instrument helps account for reserve 
changes uncorrelated with intervention and the REER.  
 
Monetary Policy 
 
This paper uses short-term real interest rate differentials to proxy for the impact of 
monetary policy on the REER. The interest rate differential is the difference 
between Chinese and U.S. short-term real rates. This is interacted with capital 
account openness, as the EBA suggests the magnitude to which monetary policy 
explains movements in the REER is influenced by the degree of openness to 
capital flows (Phillips et al. 2013, 26).  
 
Public Health Expenditure; Lagged 
 
Health expenditure is included to capture the impact on savings rates in a country. 
National savings rates can be influenced by rises and drops in public spending on 
health care. The variable is scaled to GDP. The data was obtained through the 
World Health Organization. 
 
Non-Policy Variables 
 
Demeaned Private Credit 
 
Meant to serve as an indirect measure for financial excesses, the variable is also 
intended to capture the failure of policies meant to prevent such excesses. Such 
excesses can result in shocks to demand, and real appreciation (Phillips et al. 
2013).The purpose of this variable is to indicate the impact financial policies have 
(Phillips et al. 2013) on the REER. 
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 Financial Home Bias 
 
This variable indicates domestic preference for domestic assets (Phillips et al. 
2013). It is measured as the share of domestic debt owned by residents of that 
country. Data from the Bank of International Settlements.  
 
Productivity Interacted with Capital Account Openness 
 
Measure of output per employed person for China, constructed relative to the U.S. 
Constructed as an index, baselined at 2000 quarter one. In theory capital flows 
will move from low to high productivity countries (Gourinchas and Jeanne 2013), 
to the extent to which countries permit such capital inflows (Phillips et al. 2013); 
hence the interaction with capital account openness.  
 
VIX/VXO Interacted with Capital Account Openness; Lagged 
 
Demeaned VIX over VXO is used as an indicator of global risk aversion (Phillips 
et al. 2013). The negative coefficient is linked to the need to generate a current 
account surplus when global risk aversion increases and access to credit becomes 
more constrained (Phillips et al. 2013). The EBA finds the more open the capital 
account, the stronger the effect of risk aversion. 
 
Commodity Terms of Trade 
 
The ratio of real exports to imports prices of commodities. The commodity index 
is the ratio of a geometric weighted average price of main export categories to 
commodity import categories, relative to advanced economies manufactured 
goods prices (Phillips et al. 2013, 45). The weights are given by their share in the 
countries’ exports to imports. The index is constructed from the prices of six 
commodity categories (food, fuels, agricultural raw materials, metals, gold, and 
beverages). These relative commodity prices of six categories are weighted by the 
time average of export and import shares of each commodity category in total 
trade (exports and imports of goods and services) (Phillips et al. 2013, 45). This 
data is obtained through the EBA dataset.  
 
Trade Openness 
 
The sum of exports and imports, scaled to GDP, as a proxy measure for trade 
liberalization.  
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 IMF EBA Dataset and Gap Analysis 
 
Data for log commodity terms of trade and financial home bias were obtained 
through the IMF EBA dataset. The data ends at 2010, with 2013 observations 
provided. For these two variables we use an autoregressive analysis to forecast the 
gaps until 2015. Residuals from the AR process are used as a regressor to provide 
for a more accurate forecasts, if the residuals are found to be statistically 
significant. 
The EBA constitutes a cross-country panel regression involving 40 
countries, with 769 observations from 1990 to 2010 at an annual frequency, while 
2013 observations are used in gap analysis. The methodology utilizes a set of 
policy and non-policy variables outlined above, as well as additional non-policy 
variables (e.g. South African apartheid dummy variable, population growth, and 
GDP growth forecast, own currency’s share in world reserves).  These additional 
non-policy variables were not included in this paper due to data availability 
issues, or they were found to be negligible (i.e. apartheid dummy variable, 
currency share in world reserves).  
 
The IMF EBA gap analysis can be broken down into the following steps. 
 
1. 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅 = 𝑅𝐸𝐸?̂? + 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 
 
2. 𝑅𝐸𝐸?̂? =  𝛼 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝑃𝛾 
 
3. 𝑅𝐸𝐸?̂? =  𝛼 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝑃∗𝛾 + (𝑃 − 𝑃∗)𝛾 
Where X is a vector of non-policy variables and P is a vector comprising of 
policy variables. P* constitutes desirable policy variables, as determined by the 
IMF. Gamma represents the slope parameter for the policy variable of choice.  
 (P-P*) is considered the policy gap contribution to the deviation from the 
REER norm. This paper’s focus is on the impact of intervention, and as a result 
focuses on the desirable value assigned to the intervention proxy measure (change 
in reserves/GDP * K Controls) for China. The desirable value for change in 
reserves in this case is zero. Gamma’s value is the slope parameter for the 
intervention proxy. 
The desirable value of zero is used for countries which are deemed by the IMF 
to have reserves in excess of what the IMF refers to as the “suggested adequacy 
range” (“2015 External Sector Report,” n.d., 12), determined using a confidential 
metric for assessing reserve adequacy.   
The ESR provides a composite metric. Countries with reserves in the range of 
100-150 percent of this composite metric are considered to have adequate 
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 reserves for precautionary purposes (“Assessing Reserve Adequacy - Further 
Considerations” 2013). In the IMF 2015 External Sector Report it is found that 
“China’s reserves at end-2014 were 149 percent of the unadjusted metric and 238 
percent of the metric adjusted for capital flow management measures. Under 
either metric, the staff assessment is that further accumulation is unnecessary 
from a reserves adequacy perspective.”(“2015 External Sector Report,” n.d., 12).  
This study carries out both a levels and log REER instrumented 2SLS 
regression with heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (robust Newey-
West) standard errors. The prior is used for gap analysis as discussed above, while 
the latter is used to predict a percent change in the REER, given a percent change 
in reserves. The 2SLS is carried out twice, using the same instruments as the IMF 
(i.e. M2/GDP and U.S. interest rates) as well as a new instrument (i.e. volume of 
Russian Central Bank FX swaps). The time horizon encompasses 2000 quarter 
one to 2015 quarter two.  
 
III. Results 
Instruments 
 
The underidentification test rejects the null that the equation is underidentified at 
the 5% level. The underidentification test is an LM test of whether the equation is 
identified (i.e. excluded instruments are relevant and correlated with endogenous 
regressor). It is the test of the rank of a matrix, with the rejection of the null 
indicating the matrix is full column rank (i.e. model is identified).  
In regards to testing for instruments, the first-stage F-test of the crisis 
prevention motive (m2/GDP) and Russian swaps is significant at the 1% level 
with an F-statistic of 27.27. The crisis prevention motive and U.S. short term rates 
results in an F-Statistic of 29.33, and is also significant at the 1% level. Both pairs 
of instruments exceed the F>10 threshold, rejecting the weak instruments null 
(Staiger et al. 1997; Stock and Yogo 2005). 
Concerning instrument validity, the Hansen-J test indicates the 
instruments are valid at all levels for both instrument combinations.  
 
Reserve Accumulation 
We find an additional 1% increase in reserve accumulation relative to GDP (with 
medium level capital controls in place) is predicted to depreciate the REER by 
14.9%, ceteris paribus. In contrast, EBA Results indicate a 0.75% depreciation of 
the REER for a 1% increase in reserves. 
Using the EBA methodology’s gap analysis, we find reserve accumulation 
results in a -3.1% contribution to the level of REER, in contrast to the -1.3% 
contribution the EBA finds (“2015 EBA: Individual Country Estimates” 2015, 
26). 
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 It is worth noting for the EBA the cross-sectional variation of reserve 
accumulation is twice the time variation within countries, which makes it difficult 
to determine the impact (Phillips et al.). In this paper’s instance, there is no cross-
country variation to be concerned with. What does make finding forex 
intervention’s impact challenging in our paper is determining what observed value 
should be used for gap analysis. The paper uses the average level of intervention 
from the last two years as the observed intervention value. Single quarters are 
volatile, given the heavy intervention by the PBOC over the last year.  
 
Consistency with EBA 
 
This paper finds while the impact of each variable on the REER (the sign of each 
coefficient) is consistent with EBA findings, the magnitude of the reserve 
accumulation proxy measure is not.  
Policy variables such as the real interest rate differential and lagged public 
health expenditure, along with non-policy measures such as productivity, are 
found to be statistically insignificant. This is unique to the case of China when 
contrast to EBA findings. 
Concerning the accuracy of fitted values, the EBA root MSE is about 8%, 
in contrast to under 7% with our findings. 
 
Mean Reversion 
 
Both financial home bias and the real interest rate differential interacted with 
capital account openness are found to be I(0) (integrated to order 0) stationary, 
with the augmented Dicky-Fuller test at the 1 percent level, using several different 
lag lengths. Non-stationary variables’ relevance is determined by cointegration 
testing through the Engle-Granger two-step method.  
The non-stationary characteristics seen in some data may be due to a short 
time horizon or limited observations. In such cases the standard errors are not 
reliable, and statistical inferences are not valid as a result (Engle and Granger 
1987) 
We find ln REER and change in reserves interacted with capital controls 
are cointegrated at the 5% level until two or more lags, demonstrating the 
intervention proxy measure’s significance as a non-stationary variable. This 
suggests a long-run equilibrium relationship between ln REER and reserve 
accumulation (Paul, n.d.). Cointegration also implies there exists an error 
correction data generating mechanism as well (Engle and Granger 1987). Our 
findings are consistent between both combinations of instruments used. 
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 In regards to the use of lags, literature suggests with too few lags, 
remaining serial correlation in errors will bias the ADF test (E Zivot, n.d.). 
However, the power of the test suffers with too many lags (E Zivot, n.d.). 
 
Implications for Literature 
 
We find reserve accumulation in China’s case has far more economically 
significant impact on the REER than in the cross-country panel EBA results. The 
novel use of Russian currency swaps proved to be a valid and strong instrument. 
Swaps have been used before to explain low correlation between reserves changes 
and intervention, particularly in the case of Germany (Neely 2000). The 
suggestion to use liquidity swaps to account for changes in reserves in regards to 
the intervention proxy came from Maurice Obstfeld. 
However, the liquidity swaps for another central bank (i.e. Russia) that has 
a swap agreement with a country of interest’s central bank (i.e. PBOC) was not 
found to be an instrument commonly used in existing literature to deal with the 
endogeneity issue presented by the of reserve accumulation measure. 
There is existing literature on cointegration between nominal exchange 
rates and reserve accumulation (Adam Elhiraika and Léonce Ndikumana 2007). 
Specifically in China’s case, evidence of cointegration has been found between 
the log difference in the level of forex reserves and log difference of the REER 
(Jin 2003). Our finding of cointegration between quarterly changes in FX reserves 
as a percentage of GDP and the ln REER for China is unique, and fits into current 
literature on the long-run relationship between reserve accumulation and the 
REER. 
In regards to the EBA, this paper marks a move towards country-specific 
analysis. The reason this is of value is due to the fact that the EBA relies on 
statistical significance for the intervention proxy primarily from two countries in 
the sample. If China is removed from the EBA REER regression, intervention is 
no longer significant. If Malaysia is removed, intervention is significant only at 
the 10 percent level.  
In terms of accuracy, our findings have a slightly lower root MSE than 
that of the EBA, indicating country-specific regressions may make a modest 
difference in accuracy. 
Furthermore, the pooled regression used in the EBA is unbalanced, as 
there are different numbers of observations for different nations. For example, 
there are 21 observations for the US, but only 19 for India, 14 for Indonesia, and 
12 for Pakistan. Country-specific analysis, as in this paper’s case, need not be 
concerned over unbalanced panels potentially effecting results. 
The EBA panel regression offers 21 observations at most for a nation, 
with the 2014 dataset only going as far as 2010. While it utilizes 2013 
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 observations, it does not take into account 2011-2013 in the regression. In 
drawing conclusions for 2015 this paper utilizes a dataset that encompasses a time 
horizon up to the second quarter of 2015, utilizing observations from the time 
horizon it is drawing a conclusion on. 
 
Limitations 
 
One limitation to this paper is the short time horizon used, resulting in non-
stationary variables that are not always cointegrated with ln REER (e.g. 
Demeaned private credit, log commodity terms of trade, demeaned VIX). The 
model’s ability to explain about 75% of the variation seen in the observations 
does not hold as much weight when taking into consideration the small number of 
observations (i.e. 59) used.  
There is also a higher likelihood of omitted variable bias in this work 
when contrast to cross-country panel data like that of the EBA. This is due to 
panel data’s advantage in controlling for omitted variables. 
 
Future Steps 
 
There remain several steps to take to further this paper. A first-differences 
regression would aid in dealing with non-stationary data, and would go hand-in-
hand with investigating for multicointegration in regards to I(2) systems. 
We wish to test for nonlinear relationships as well. For example, some 
literature suggests a nonlinear approach to evaluate the relationship between the 
real interest rate differential and REER (Nakagawa 2002). 
Next, country-specific analysis provides for looking at variables impacted 
by the level of capital controls in place. Little to moderate levels of capital 
controls has been found to influence financial home bias (Forslund, Lima, and 
Panizza 2011), so it would be appropriate to interact with CC as a future step. 
Finally, we would like to find the impact of reserve accumulation by 
currency composition by Dollar reserves, Euro reserves, et cetera. This is 
currently impossible as the PBOC has not disclosed this publicly. 
 
 
 
12
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 13 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol13/iss1/5
 Works Cited 
 
“2015 EBA: Individual Country Estimates.” 2015. International Monetary Funds. 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/res/eba/pdf/2015estimates.pdf. 
“2015 External Sector Report.” n.d. International Monetary Fund. 07/27/2015. 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2015/062615.pdf. 
Adam Elhiraika, and Léonce Ndikumana. 2007. “Reserves Accumulation in 
African Countries: Sources, Motivations, and Effects.” University of 
Massachusetts, Amherst, December. 
Andrey Ostroukh. 2014. “Russia and China Open Currency-Swap Line.” The 
Wall Street Journal, October 13. http://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-and-
china-open-currency-swap-line-1413207546. 
“Assessing Reserve Adequacy - Further Considerations.” 2013. International 
Monetary Fund. 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/111313d.pdf. 
Bettina Peiers. 1997. “Informed Traders, Intervention, and Price Leadership: A 
Deeper View of the Microstructure of the Foreign Exchange Market.” 
Journal of Finance, September, 1589–1614. 
Bloomberg. 2016. “China’s Foreign-Exchange Reserves Decline to $3.23 
Trillion,” February 6. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-
07/china-s-foreign-exchange-reserves-decline-to-3-23-trillion. 
Bloomberg News. 2014. “China Offers Russia Help With Currency Swap 
Suggestion,” December 21. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-22/china-offers-russia-
help-with-suggestion-of-wider-currency-swap. 
Bloomberg 2016. “China Capital Outflows Rise to Estimated $1 Trillion in 2015,” 
January 25. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-25/china-
capital-outflows-climb-to-estimated-1-trillion-in-2015. 
C. Fred Bergsten, and Jeffrey J. Schott. 2015. “TPP and Exchange Rates.” 
Peterson Institute for International Economics. November 7. 
https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/tpp-and-exchange-
rates. 
Charles Engel. 2011. “Capital Controls: What Have We Learned?” Bank for 
International Settlements 68 (November): 22–23. 
Charles Goodhart, and Thomas Hesse. 1993. “Central Bank Forex Intervention 
Assessed in Continuous Time.” Journal of International Money and 
Finance, August, 368–89. 
Christopher Neely. 2000. “The Practice of Central Bank Intervention: Looking 
Under the Hood.” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
Chuin-Wei Yap. 2016. “China’s Forex Reserves Fall by Record $107.9 Billion on 
Yuan Fears.” The Wall Street Journal, January 7. 
13
Banerjee: Determining Yuan Valuation
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2016
 http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-foreign-exchange-reserves-fall-107-
92-billion-in-december-1452161583#:uPTfW_5xZaugfA. 
C. Neely. 2000. “Are Changes in Foreign Exchange Reserves Well Correlated 
with Official Intervention?” Review- Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis 
82 (5): 17–32. 
Colm Kearney, and Ronald MacDonald. 1986. “Intervention and Sterilisation 
under Floating Exchange Rates: The UK 1973- 1983.” European 
Economic Review, April, 345–64. 
Douglas Staiger, James H. Stock, and Mark W. Watson. 1997. “The NAIRU, 
Unemployment and Monetary Policy.” The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 11 (1): 33–49. 
E Zivot. n.d. “Unit Root Lecture 2.” University of Washington. 
Forslund, Lima, and Panizza. 2011. “The Determinants of the Composition of 
Public Debt in Developing and Emerging Market Countries.” Review of 
Development Finance 1 (3): 207–22. 
Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier, and Olivier Jeanne. 2013. “Capital Flows to 
Developing Countries: The Allocation Puzzle.” The Review of Economic 
Studies 80 (4): 1484–1515. doi:10.1093/restud/rdt004. 
Hali J. Edison. 1993. “The Effectiveness of Central-Bank Intervention: A Survey 
of the Literature After 1982.” International Finance Section, Department 
of Economics, Princeton University 18. 
H Nakagawa. 2002. “Real Exchange Rates and Real Interest Rate Differentials: 
Implications of Nonlinear Adjustment in Real Exchange Rates.” Journal 
of Monetary Economics 49 (2): 629–49. 
James H. Stock, and Motohiro Yogo. 2005. “Testing for Weak Instruments in 
Linear IV Regression.” 
Joe Weisenthal. 2015. “The Recent History of the Chinese Yuan in One, Big 
Chart.” Bloomberg Markets, August. 
Kathryn Dominguez. 2008. “Sterilization.” The Princeton Encyclopedia of the 
World Economy. Princeton University Press. 
Lingling Wei. 2016. “China’s Forex Reserves Plunge to More-Than-Three-Year 
Low.” The Wall Street Journal, February 7. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-forex-reserves-plunge-to-more-than-
three-year-low-1454816583#:WC7aU2qvSfdISA. 
Manfred Gartner. 1987. “Intervention Policy under Floating Exchange Rates: An 
Analysis of the Swiss Case.” Economica, November, 439–53. 
Maurice Obstfeld. 1983. “Exchange Rates, Inflation, and the Sterilization 
Problem: Germany, 1975-1981.” European Economic Review, April, 161–
89. 
14
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 13 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol13/iss1/5
 M.S. Mohanty, and B.E. Berger. 2013. “Central Bank Views on Foreign 
Exchange Intervention.” Bank for International Settlements, no. 73: 55–
74. 
Pete Sweeney, and Lu Jianxin. 2014. “China Doubles Yuan Trading Band, Seen 
as Sign of Confidence.” Reuters, March 15. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-yuanband-
idUSBREA2E07V20140315. 
Phillip Inman, and Fergus Ryan. 2015. “China Stuns Financial Markets by 
Devaluing Yuan for Second Day Running.” The Guardian, August 12. 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/aug/12/china-yuan-slips-
again-after-devaluation. 
Ranjit Kumar Paul. n.d. “Cointegration.” Indian Agricultural Statistics Research 
Institute. 
“Remarks by Under Secretary for International Affairs Timothy D. Adams.” 
2005. U.S. Department of the Treasury. September 23. 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js2940.aspx. 
R Engle, and C Granger. 1987. “Cointegration and Error Correction: 
Representation, Estimation and Testing.” Econometrica 35: 251–76. 
Steven Phillips, Luis Catao, Luca Ricci, Rudolfs Bems, Mitali Das, Julian Di 
Giovanni, D. Filiz Unsal, et al. 2013. “The External Balance Assessment 
(EBA) Methodology.” International Monetary Fund, December. 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13272.pdf. 
Utpal Bhattacharya, and Paul Weller. 1997. “The Advantage to Hiding One’s 
Hand: Speculation and Central Bank Intervention in the Foreign Exchange 
Market.” Journal of Monetary Economics, July, 251–77. 
Zhongxia Jin. 2003. “The Dynamics of Real Interest Rates, Real Exchange Rates 
and the Balance of Payments in China: 1980-2002.” International 
Monetary Fund, April. 
 
 
15
Banerjee: Determining Yuan Valuation
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2016
 Appendices 
 
Exhibit 1 
 
Ln(REER) Regression with M2/GDP and U.S. Interest Rates as Instruments 
 
Centered R2 = 0.7447 
Lag is 3 quarters 
Observations: 59 
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 Exhibit 2 
 
Fitted values Scattered Against Residuals with M2/GDP and U.S. Interest Rates 
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 Exhibit 3 
 
Fitted and Observed Values with M2/GDP and U.S. Interest Rates 
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 Exhibit 4 
 
Ln(REER) Regression with M2/GDP and Russian Swaps as Instruments 
 
Centered R2 = 0.7557 
Lag is 3 quarters 
Observations: 59 
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 Exhibit 5 
 
Fitted values Scattered Against Residuals with M2/GDP and Russian Swaps 
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 Exhibit 6 
 
Fitted and Observed Values with M2/GDP and Russian Swaps 
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 Exhibit 7 
 
Log REER Actual and Fitted Values from EBA 
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